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Abstract. A  nested mode ontology allows one to make sense of apparently 
contradictory Christological claims such as that Christ knows everything and 
there are some things Christ does not know.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to traditional Christian doctrine, Christ is God and Christ 
is human. God knows everything. A  human being does not know 
everything (if only because a human being’s finite mind cannot hold all 
the infinitely many mathematical truths). Thus Christ knows everything 
and does not know everything, surely a  contradiction. Likewise, God 
always feels infinite joy, while Jesus Christ was tortured to death. Thus, 
Christ felt infinite joy and yet was tortured to death. A standard response 
to these apparent contradictions is that Christ qua God feels infinite 
joy and knows everything, but qua human he was tortured and there 
are things he does not know. However, this ‘qua’ not only seems to be 
an  obscure cheat, but it is not clear how it removes the contradiction 
(Morris, 1987).
The ‘qua’ move is not a cheat. I will start with a nested mode or trope 
ontology inspired by Spinoza and Aristotle. Then I will discuss how we 
would express facts within that ontology in English, and show that very 
naturally one gets locutions that have a formal structure similar to the 
Christological case, including that mysterious ‘qua’. I  will outline the 
beginning of a semantics for the Christological locutions. Finally, I will 
discuss the possibility of extending the story outside of the nested mode 
context, and how one might reconcile the account with divine simplicity.1
1 For an  excellent thorough recent discussion of the ways of understanding the 
Christological ‘qua’, see Pawl (2015).
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II. NESTED MODES AND ESSENCES
Modes are particular instances of properties. They are often called ‘tropes’ 
in contemporary metaphysics, but I will use the older term ‘mode’ so as 
not to suggest a trope-bundle ontology (what I say may be compatible 
with a trope-bundle ontology, but does not require it). The accidents of 
Aristotelian ontology should be seen as modes, and in those Aristotelian 
ontologies that suppose individual essences, essences are modes as 
well. And the term ‘mode’ is found throughout the work of Descartes, 
Leibniz and Spinoza. Beyond trope theory proper, the qualia of some 
contemporary philosophies of mind are probably best seen as modes of 
conscious being or modes of thought.
On a mode ontology, whenever an object satisfies a fundamental unary 
predicate, it has a corresponding mode. Thus, if ‘is negatively charged’ is 
a fundamental unary predicate, and Ellie the electron is spinning, then 
Ellie has a mode of spin, Ellie’s spin. If Pam the positron is also spinning, 
even if its spin is just like Ellie’s, Pam’s spin is still something distinct 
from Ellie’s.
There will also be modes corresponding to non-unary predicates. If 
‘loves’ is fundamental, then when Romeo loves Juliet, there is at least one 
mode of love. There are a number of options here:
(1) There is a  single relational mode, which can be denoted either 
‘Romeo’s loving Juliet’ or ‘Juliet’s being loved by Romeo’, and both 
Romeo and Juliet have that mode.
(2) There are two relational modes, Romeo’s loving Juliet and 
Juliet’s being loved by Romeo, and Romeo and Juliet have them 
respectively.
(3) There is only a single relational mode, Romeo’s loving Juliet, and 
Romeo has it.
(4) There is only a  single relational mode, Juliet’s being loved by 
Romeo, and Juliet has it.
Given that coming to be loved appears to be a mere Cambridge change, 
while coming to have a mode appears to be a non-Cambridge change, 
we have good reason to opt for (3). But perhaps I am wrong about that, 
and anyway in the case of other predicates other options may be more 
appropriate.
I  leave open whether there are modes corresponding to non-
fundamental predications (but see Section 3).
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Now, a central insight in Spinoza’s ontology is that modes can nested. 
Thus, Ellie’s spin might be upward, and then assuming the direction of 
spin is fundamental, Ellie’s spin will have its mode of upwardness. In this 
case, we will say that the upwardness is a remote mode of Ellie while it 
is presumably an immediate mode of Ellie’s spin. Note that this example 
suggests a  promising way of connecting nested mode ontology with 
theories of determinables. Perhaps whenever ν is a mode of μ, then μ 
corresponds to a determinable while ν to its determinate.
In general, we can say that ν is a  remote mode of x (where x is 
an individual or a mode) provided that there is a mode μ such that (a) μ 
is distinct from ν and x (in Section 6 we will discuss whether something 
could in be a mode of itself), (b) ν is a mode of μ and (c) μ is a mode 
of x. And an immediate mode of x is a mode of x that is not a remote 
mode of x.
Spinoza, of course, goes overboard on this: he makes everything, with 
the exception of God, be a mode of something else, and so we ourselves 
end up being infinitely remote modes of God. But we need not follow 
him there.
Next, let us introduce an Aristotelian element. One of the modes of 
an individual is an essence. Being a mode, this is an individual essence: 
although you and I have humanity as our essences, yours is yours and 
mine is mine.
We now have a  decision point that will be crucial. We could take 
an essence to be simply yet another immediate mode of an individual. 
But there is a more daring move possible, one that both has metaphysical 
benefits and will be crucial to our account of the Incarnation: we could 
suppose that only essences are immediate modes of individuals.
The main metaphysical benefit of this supposition is that it allows us 
to give an elegant account of what an essence is. As Fine (1994, 1995) has 
shown, the Aristotelian notion of an essence should not be analyzed in 
terms of modally essential properties, i.e., properties that an entity could 
not fail to have. Essences are more explanatorily fundamental than the 
accidents.2 The supposition that essences are the immediate modes of 
individuals then provides us with an  elegant account of essences that 
highlights this fundamentality. For all other modes of an individual will 
be modes (immediate or remote) of essences, but it is reasonable to take 
2 For other attempts to account for the fundamentality of essences, see Gorman (2005) 
and Pruss (forthcoming).
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a mode of x, at least when the mode is distinct from x, to be dependent 
on x. (How our hypothesis connects with modal notions of essential 
properties is a question for further investigation.)
Thus, given our supposition, we can give an elegant account of the 
notions of individual, essence and accident in terms of modes and 
remoteness. An individual is something that is not a mode of something 
else. An essence is an immediate mode of an individual. An accident is 
a remote mode of an individual.
I  will henceforth make the supposition that only essences are 
immediate modes of individuals.
If we combine this supposition with the hypothesis that the nesting of 
modes corresponds to the determinable-determinate relationship, then 
we conclude that all our other fundamental properties are determinates 
of the property corresponding to our essence, presumably our humanity. 
My believing that the Pythagorean Theorem is true is then a way of my 
being human, just as being green is a way of having color. This is an 
attractive way of thinking about ourselves.
III. TALKING ABOUT NESTED MODES
Suppose that Sally has a mode of running and her mode of running has 
a mode of quickness. Then we could correctly say:
(5) Sally is running quickly.
and conclude from this that:
(6) Sally is running.
and
(7) Sally is quick.
But the second conclusion can mislead. For suppose that she is also 
texting. We had better not conclude from (7) and
(8) Sally is texting
that
(9) Sally is texting quickly.
It is quite clear in our mode ontology why the inference here fails. Sally’s 
quickness is a  mode of her running, but perhaps not a  mode of her 
texting. For Sally to be texting quickly, it is not enough that she have 
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a quickness and a texting, but she would need a quickness that is a mode 
of the texting3 (assuming, contrary to fact, that texting is fundamental).
Suppose that Sally’s texting is slow. Then just as we got to say that she 
is quick, we get to say that
(10) Sally is slow
(or maybe we prefer the wording: ‘Sally is being slow’) or even
(11) Sally is not quick.
There is, nonetheless, an air of contradiction between (7) and (10), and 
even more so between (7) and (11). To clear this up, we might expand 
on these to say:
(1) Sally is quick qua someone running.
(2) Sally is slow qua someone texting.
(3) Sally is non-quick qua someone texting.
For instance, the last of these says that she is texting, but her texting isn’t 
quick.
Thus, expressing innocent claims about nested modes leads quite 
naturally to adverbial predications like (5), to apparently contradictory 
claims like (7), (10) and (11), and finally to ‘qua’ claims.
Nonetheless, not all sentences of the above sort need correspond so 
neatly with claims about nested modes. In the above, we assumed that 
‘is running’, ‘is texting’, ‘is slow’ and ‘is quick’ are fundamental. But of 
course in the case of ‘is texting’ this is almost surely not so, and the case 
of the other predicates is also not clear.
There are two possibilities here. If we have an  abundant mode 
ontology, where every correct predication corresponds to a mode, then 
the above needs no adjustment. But if we have a sparse mode ontology, 
where only fundamental correct predications correspond to modes, 
we need to complicate matters. Presumably, non-fundamental claims 
are grounded in fundamental ones, and the above story will apply in 
the fundamental cases. Likewise, it is plausible that if we can resolve 
the apparent contradictions in the cases of fundamental Christological 
predications, then it should be possible to generalize to the non-
fundamental case. There may be difficulties, but apart from the special 
case of negative predications – which we will discuss in Section 4.4 – we 
3 This is the same issue that Geach  (1956) famously discusses for ‘good’: that 
a basketball player is good and also a golfer does not imply that she is a good golfer, 
much less a good human being.
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leave those for future research. Thus, from now on, I will simply pretend 
that all the positive predicates we are concerned with are fundamental.
Finally, a  verbal point should be noted. When Sally’s running has 
a mode of quickness, it is correct to say both that Sally’s running is quick 
and that Sally is quick. But sometimes a different predicate is applied in 
the case of the mode and the individual. For instance, suppose Sally’s 
texting is rife with spelling errors. But we shouldn’t say that Sally is rife 
with spelling errors. In fact, even in the case of running, when we say 
that Sally is quick and that Sally’s running is quick, we are using ‘is quick’ 
in two different senses.
The verbal point is particularly apposite when we are talking of 
modes of the essence in our mode ontology. For instance, when Socrates 
knows  p, there is a  knowledge-of-p mode, which on this ontology is 
a mode of Socrates’ humanity. In virtue of this knowledge mode, Socrates 
knows p. But it is incorrect to say that Socrates’ humanity knows p. We 
do not, in fact, have a convenient way of expressing the predicate that 
applies to Socrates’ humanity in virtue of its possession of the knowledge 
mode. Perhaps we might say that Socrates’ humanity is determined to 
human knowledge of p or that Socrates’ humanity confers knowledge of 
p on him. It should not, however, surprise us if we do not have readymade 
terms when we analyze things so finely.
IV. CHRISTOLOGICAL APPLICATION
4.1 Basic account
Suppose now that – as far as we know uniquely – Christ is an individual 
with two essences: humanity and divinity. And then each of these 
essences has the kinds of modes proper to it.
When Socrates feels pain, Socrates’ essence – his humanity mode – 
has a pain mode. When Christ suffers, his essence of humanity has a pain 
mode. That Socrates’ humanity has a pain mode is sufficient to make it 
true that Socrates feels pain. That Christ’s humanity has a pain mode is 
sufficient to make it true that he feels pain. ‘Christ feels pain’ is just as 
literally true as ‘Socrates feels pain’, and both statements are true for the 
same kinds of reasons.
Likewise, just as God the Father has a mode of infinite joy, which is 
a mode of his divinity, so too Christ’s divinity has a mode of infinite joy. 
And just as the fact that the Father has a divinity with a mode of infinite 
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joy makes it true that the Father has infinite joy, so too that Christ 
has a  divinity (the numerically same divinity, according to orthodox 
Trinitarianism) with a  mode of infinite joy makes it true, and true in 
exactly the same sense, that Christ has infinite joy.
At the crucifixion, it would thus be correct to say:
(1) Christ has infinite joy
(2) Christ is in horrendous pain.
The two claims are no more in conflict than the claims that Sally is quick 
and Sally is slow.
And just as in Sally’s case we removed the appearance of contradiction 
by saying that she is quick qua running and slow qua texting, here we can 
say:
(1) Christ has infinite joy qua divine
(2) Christ is in horrendous pain qua human.
There is nothing particularly mysterious about the ‘qua’ in (17) and 
(18): it simply indicates which mode – the divine essence or the human 
essence – the joy and pain modes are respectively modes of.
We could also express (17) and (18) adverbially, though the locutions 
would sound a little strange:
(1) Christ is infinitely joyfully divine.
(2) Christ is horrendously painfully human.
When only one of Christ’s essences is conversationally salient, we can 
omit the mention of essence, and simply make claims like (15) and (16).
In the case of ordinary human beings, we could always add ‘qua 
human’ to attributions of pains, pleasures, and the like. But there would 
be no point, since only one essence – an essence of humanity – is salient 
when we talk of an ordinary human being, as an ordinary human being 
(one can take this as partly stipulative of ‘ordinary’) has only one essence.
4.2 Metaphysical truth conditions
Facts about a  nested mode ontology are naturally expressed with qua 
locutions. When dealing with positive F, a metaphysical truth condition 
(cf. Sider 2011, Section 7.4) for
(3) x is F qua G
is something like
(4) has a Gness mode which in turn has an Fness mode.
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As noted at the end of Section  3, ‘Fness mode’ should be understood 
loosely: ‘Fness mode’ need not describe a mode by virtue of which x’s 
Gness mode is F, but rather perhaps a mode by virtue of which x’s Gness 
mode makes x be F.
But of course Scripture and liturgy do not use locutions like (21). 
Instead, we have simple predications, like that Christ existed before 
all (created) things or that Christ died on the cross. How do we give 
metaphysical truth conditions for such predications?
First, some sentences use a  predicate that simply expresses the 
individual’s essence. Call these ‘essence predicates’.4 For these, the truth 
conditions are somewhat trivial: the predicate applies to the individual 
if and only if the individual has a  requisite essence. Thus, the truth 
condition for ‘Christ is human’ is simply that Christ has a  humanity 
mode.
Now consider a  positive non-essence predicate F. Depending on 
wording and context, there will be two possibilities for a truth condition 
for
(5) X is F,
where X is a term denoting Christ. First, we might have unspecified truth 
conditions, namely:
(6) X has an essence that has a mode of Fness
or we might have one of the two specified truth conditions:
(7) X’s divine essence has a mode of Fness
or
(8) X’s human essence has a mode of Fness.
Sometimes the choice of designator X makes clear whether (25) or (26) is 
appropriate by making either divinity or humanity relevant. If X is ‘Jesus’, 
‘the Son of Mary’ or the like, then humanity is likely to be relevant, while 
if X is ‘the Son of God’, ‘the Second Person of the Trinity’ or a similar 
term, then divinity is likely to be relevant. On the other hand, the term 
‘Christ’ does not clearly make one or the other nature relevant.
In the context of a conversation that defers linguistically to Christian 
orthodoxy, where the interlocutors use language in the way Christian 
4 They are not to be confused with ‘essential predicates’ in the modal sense, namely 
those predicates that must apply to an individual if that individual is to exist.
73NESTED MODES, ‘QUA’ AND THE INCARNATION
orthodoxy traditionally does,5 the predicate F may itself be an indicator 
of whether we should adopt the reading in (25) or the one in (26). 
Divinity is relevant when we speak of Christ creating and humanity 
when we speak of Christ being born.
But often unspecified truth conditions seem appropriate. A competent 
speaker can responsibly say of a distant animal that it is running without 
having to know whether it is a dog or a fox, so that even if the animal is 
a fox, we perhaps should not say that truth condition is
(9) The animal’s vulpine essence has a mode of running
but
(10) The animal has an essence that has a mode of running.
Likewise, when wording and context do not make salient a particular 
essence of Christ, the unspecified reading (24) may well be more 
appropriate. In theological discussion, liturgy and other specialized 
contexts, one of the two specified truth conditions for Christological 
predications may well be appropriate. But in more ordinary contexts, the 
unspecified truth conditions are likely to often be appropriate. As always 
with such contextual matters, precise rules are not available.
4.3 The grammar of ‘qua’
Pawl (2015) classifies ‘qua’-based responses to the apparent Christological 
contradictions on the basis of the role played by the term ‘qua’: it could 
signal tense, signal a  tacit sortal, or modify the subject, predicate or 
copula. Perhaps surprisingly it is not quite clear how the above account 
fits into Pawl’s classification. On the present account, in the context 
where Sally’s running is salient, all of the following sentences will have 
the same metaphysical truth condition, namely that Sally’s running 
mode has a quickness mode:
(1) Sally is quick.
(2) Sally is quick qua running.
(3) Sally’s running is quick.
(4) Sally is running quickly.
At this point there appears to be a choice point for our theory. Do we 
take (30) to mean something like (31) or something like (32)? If we go 
5 Which may or may not mean that the interlocutors themselves subscribe to this 
orthodoxy. They may defer linguistically and then go on to criticize.
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for (31), then it seems that our ‘qua’ modifies the subject, making clear 
that the subject is Sally’s running mode. On the other hand, if we go for 
(32), then it seems the predicate is being modified. Whereas it seemed 
that the predicate was simply ‘is quick’, it really is ‘is running quickly.’ But 
perhaps this is only an illusion of a choice point. After all, all the four 
sentences in this context have the same metaphysical truth conditions. 
Perhaps there is but one fact here that is expressed in four different ways: 
elliptically in (29), with ‘qua’ in (30), and then in two grammatically 
distinct ways in (31) and (32).
We can, however, say something more in terms of Sider’s (2011) 
notion of carving at the joints, if we take the nested mode ontology to be 
not only a correct ontology, but a correct fundamental ontology. On the 
nested mode ontology, it is (31) that carves closest to the joints of reality, 
as the ideology of (31) is precisely that of the nested mode ontology, and 
so there is a sense in which the present account is a subject-modification 
account. But if our only purpose is to defend the coherence of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, then we do not need to embrace nested 
mode ontology as the fundamental ontology. One might, for instance, 
say that while it’s true to say that there are nested modes, there is some 
more fundamental account of nested mode language. In that case, (31) 
may no longer carve closest to the joints.
4.4 Negative predications
In the joy and pain examples of Section  4.1, I  made things easy for 
myself: I considered what were at least at first sight6 positive predications. 
Indeed, one might be unimpressed by the account I gave, since perhaps 
even an ordinary human could experience great joy and great pain at the 
same time.
But now consider something which is much more plausibly 
contradictory. Let p be some proposition that God knows but no human 
being knows. Then it seems we have:
(1) Christ knows p
(2) Christ does not know p.
And here the contradiction appears much more blatant.
6 One might think with Augustine that evil is privation, and hence pain, or at least 
whatever is responsible for the badness of the pain, is at least partly constituted by the 
absence of something.
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Now, if there are negative modes, like a mode of ignorance, then there 
is no special difficulty here. Christ’s divinity has a mode of knowledge of p 
while Christ’s humanity has a mode of ignorance of p. But it is implausible 
that for every case where x lacks a positive mode, x has a distinct mode of 
lacking such a positive mode. That would make each of us not only have 
infinitely many modes, but modes beyond cardinality.7
But of course negative predications also occur in perfectly ordinary 
nested mode cases. When Sally is running quickly but texting slowly, 
then she is quick and not quick. She is quick because her mode of 
running has a mode of quickness, and she is not quick because her mode 
of texting lacks a mode of quickness. Again, inserting ‘qua’ will remove 
the air of contradiction.
Thus, Christ knows p because his divinity has a mode of knowledge 
of p, and Christ does not know p because his humanity lacks any mode 
of knowledge of p. Note that the grounds for which it is correct to say 
that Christ knows p are just like grounds that make it correct to say that 
the Father knows p: that there is a mode of knowledge had by the mode 
of divinity. And just as Socrates may not know p, because his humanity 
lacks a mode of knowledge of p, so too Christ’s ignorance is grounded in 
his humanity’s lacking a mode of knowledge of p.
One might object as follows. The right metaphysical truth conditions 
for
(3) Socrates knows p
are not
(4) Socrates’ human essence has a knowledge-of-p mode.
For it is epistemically possible for (35) to be true even if it turns out that 
Socrates is non-human. Rather, we should take the truth conditions for 
(35) to be:
(5) Socrates has an essence that has a knowledge-of-p mode.
But then
(6) Socrates does not know p
7 I  am at best acquainted with finitely many sets. If for every set a  that I  am not 
acquainted with I  have a  distinct mode of non-acquaintance with a, then I  will have 
a mode of non-acquaintance for each set, except for finitely many. And the class of all 
sets has no cardinality, nor does it gain a cardinality when we take finitely many members 
away.
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will have as its truth conditions:
(7) Socrates has no essence that has a knowledge-of-p mode.
By parallel, then, in a  context where unspecified truth conditions are 
appropriate, we should say that (34) implies:
(8) Christ has no essence that has a knowledge-of-p mode.
And (40) is false on our account, since God has an essence with a mode 
of knowledge of p, namely his divine essence.
Now, first of all, it is not clear that metaphysical truth conditions 
have to track what is epistemically open to the individual (Sider 2011, 
Section 7.4 expressly denies it). It might be epistemically open that tables 
have no particles in them, but the true metaphysical truth conditions for 
‘There is a table’ might still be that there are particles arranged tablewise. 
So it is still open to insist that the right metaphysical truth conditions for 
(35) are given by (36), and hence the metaphysical truth conditions for 
(38) are:
(9) Socrates’ humanity has no knowledge-of-p mode.
That said, it is better if the truth conditions remain closer to being 
epistemically available to the individual, as was discussed in the case of 
the distant fox.
But even granting that (37) is the right truth condition for (35), the 
objection assumes a wide scope8 reading of the negation in (38), namely 
that (38) denies (35). But one can also take the negation to have narrow 
scope, in which case the nested mode ontology’s truth condition could 
be:
(10) Socrates has an essence that has no knowledge-of-p mode.
Similarly, when we hear that Sally is not quick, we do not assume that she 
is nowise quick. Rather, usually there is a contextually relevant attribute 
and we are being told that she is not quick at that, and even when context 
does not specify the attribute, we do not assume that she is nowise quick.
We do not normally need to make the narrow–wide scope distinction 
in the case of attributes like knowledge of p, but that is because normally 
we deal with beings like Socrates that have only one essence, and so there 
8 Or medium wide. Perhaps (39) should be read as committing one to the existence of 
Socrates, while the widest scope reading of the negation in (38) would not.
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is only one contextually relevant essence that might or might not possess 
a knowledge-of-p mode. Given the auxiliary premise that Socrates has 
only one essence, one can indeed derive (39) from the denial of (36), and 
normally we tacitly accept such premises.
But of course once we start speaking about beings with more than one 
essence, we need to make a decision on how to read negative sentences. 
A natural move is to take negations to be narrow scope, unless they are 
qualified or strengthened in a way that forces a wide scope reading, as in: 
‘Christ nowise does wrong.’
V. WITHOUT NESTED MODES
One may even be able to have the main outlines of the above story 
without nested modes. Instead of taking
(11) Socrates knows p
as grounded in
(12) Socrates’ humanity has a knowledge-of-p mode,
we could take it as grounded in:
(13) Socrates’ humanity is p-knowledge-conferring,
where we do not take the application of the predicate ‘is p-knowledge-
conferring’ to be grounded in a knowledge-of-p mode. We can understand 
the predication in (45) in line with our favorite non-trope theory of 
predication, whether Platonist, conceptualist or nominalist. We still need 
a commitment to individual essences, but not to any remote modes.
If we proceed in this way, however, we lose the analogy between 
Christological predications and sentences about Sally’s being quick 
(qua running or qua texting). That loss makes the theory less plausible 
in a way that perhaps cancels out the benefits of not having to have to 
nested modes. Nonetheless, an ingredient from the modified theory may 
be useful in the next section. And even if less plausible, the theory may 
have a use in showing the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, 
much in the way that van Inwagen (1995) has used relative identity theory 
to show the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity without endorsing 
relative identities in ordinary cases.
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VI. DIVINE SIMPLICITY
The above account of Christological predication requires that God have 
a divine essence, and that this essence in turn have modes. On its face 
this is incompatible with divine simplicity: it implies something like 
the essence-accident complexity that is denied by proponents of divine 
simplicity like Aquinas (1920, I.3.6).
But this is too quick. When we say that God has an essence ε and 
the essence has a mode μ, this does not force us to admit three things. 
For it might be that they are all identical, so that God = ε = μ, just as 
an officer, a doctor and a wife may all be one person. Granted, the mode 
μ is a mode of the essence ε, and the essence ε is an essence of God, but 
just as one can be one’s own enemy, so too perhaps something can be its 
own mode and its own individual essence. (It won’t do to object that the 
essence is abstract while God is concrete, since modes are best taken to 
be concrete.)
Consider, after all, a plausible functional characterization of modes: 
an immediate Fness mode μ of x is an object μ such that μ, or at least 
x and μ together,9 fully grounds x’s being F. But when x itself fully 
grounds x being F, then the functional characterization makes x be its 
own Fness trope. And on the Oppy-Brower-Pruss account of divine 
simplicity (Oppy 2003; Brower 2008; Pruss 2008), God truthmakes, 
and hence grounds, all the intrinsic attributes of God. (The question of 
the extension of that account to non-intrinsic attributes, while indeed 
a challenge to the proponent of simplicity, is not a special difficulty for 
our nested mode account of the incarnation.)
Alternately, one might simply posit the identity between God and his 
essence, as typical proponents of divine simplicity do, and then apply 
the suggestion of Section 5 so that one can do without nested modes. 
Or at least without them on the side of the divine essence. Perhaps, for 
instance, something like trope theory is the right account of predication 
in the case of creaturely subjects but ostrich nominalism is the right 
account for God.
9 This option or some further refinement may be needed if we are to leave open 
an understanding of transsubstantiation on which the modes of bread and wine persist 
even when there no longer is any bread or wine, but only Christ’s body and blood. For in 
such a case, we probably wouldn’t want to say that the bread’s persistent whiteness trope 
grounds the bread’s being white, since the bread is presumably not white when it doesn’t 
exist (maybe, though, we could take it to ground the past whiteness of the bread?).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Nested mode facts are naturally expressed with ‘qua’ sentences such 
that when the ‘qua’ clause is left off, some of the sentences will look 
contradictory. A  start of a  metaphysical semantics for Christological 
predication in terms of modes of the human and divine essence can be 
given.
The account has the very significant advantage that ordinary 
predicates like ‘is sitting’ to Christ can apply to Christ for exactly the 
same reasons that they can apply to us: the subject’s human essence 
has the relevant mode. It is indeed a  desideratum on a  theory of the 
incarnation that there be such a uniformity between the application of 
ordinary creaturely predicates to Christ and to us – Christ is a human 
being like us, except in sin. In this way, the present account will be 
superior to property transference accounts like Leftow’s (2002) and 
Stump’s (2002) on which ordinary predicates apply to Christ because 
they apply to a proper part of Christ, say his body and soul composite, 
since it does not seem that in our own case the ordinary predicates apply 
to us because they apply to a proper part of us (for a discussion of such 
property borrowing accounts, see Jeffrey 2014).10
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